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EVE OF

V, 1, LENIN
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IEDrTOR'S FOREWORD

TEE ever deepening
the sharpening economic
disorganisation in the
disintegration of
!he petty-bour ois
mass foIlowing
to tbe B ~ M & led Leain to deche at the end of S e p t m k , 1917:
"We have before t~ all the objective prerequiaitea for a succemful
uprising." From this point on he premed with determination for
the commencing of the -n
preparations for the seizure of
pmu. At this critical p
o
d
,howwer, he waa deprived of p e r m d
articipation in the wor of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik
had
!arty where the final decisions regarding the armed up
to be made, Living in hiding on a atdctly conapirative ha=.,
nevertheless, carried on am energetic correspondence with the Bolshevik leadera in Petrograd, presenting his vim on werg important
phaaa of the q u d m of the uprising.
At the beginning of the revolution lienin had to wage a struggle
againat some leading BoIsheviks for a correct ap raisal of the
nature of the revolotim and the r6le of the ~ e h Party.
d
(See
The Tmks o/ tlie ProLarLtt in Om L r e u o W n and The A r i g ,
Conference, Little h i n Library, Vola. 9 and 10.) SimJarIy, wgfll I
tbe revolution had reached the stage which made the reaIisation
of the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" a certainty, Lenin again
ewountered an opposition which he had to overcome to aave the
Party from making the historid blunder of miwing the propitious I
mome~tfor the transfer of power to the Swiets.
In bis communications to the Central Commim after the liquidation of the Kornilav revolt, Lenin insisted upon a decision in favour
of the uprising, but h a 1 action was being delayed because of the
dipiaon of opinion in the cormnittee. Not until the meeting of tbe
Central Committee on October 23, with Lenin atten
, w a find
decision taken. k i n reported on the timeIineas of e uprising,
showing that the BoMevik~had w c u d the majority amung the
ta were rising throughout the land, while
workera, that the
at the same t h e erensky was plotting to behead the revolution b
huniDg over Petrograd to the Gennam. In the resolution, whi
he wrote, LRnin declared that "armed uprising was irrevihbIe and
has fully matured." The resolution was adopted with Kamenev
and Zinoviev voting- w
nst it, while Stalin and. otberar mergetidy
-i
eu ported Lenin.
fn hi. letter "Marxism and UpMng" which hegins this collection
writtan Septmba 2627, Lenin anawers the charge that the ~ o l :
&& were BIanquisfs, explains why h e uprising during the July
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have been premature, while the KorniIov revolt and its
the situation. He a h arguw for
Warx's conception that "uprising is an art" and that it must be
treated a~ such. In hia other lettere Lxb polemises against
b w n e v and Zinoviev and their following, particularly against
their policy of watchful waiting and a g h t their conception of the
file. of the 3oIshevik Party as the Left Wing in the Comtihrent
Assembly when the latter is convened. With devastating criticism
be w
e
a
r against their contentions that the Bolsheviks were isalated
end not strong enough alone to undertake the uprising; that the
Gemam were not threatening Petrogad and the bourgeoisie would
not dare to sacrifice it; tbat it would be better to wait until the
counter-revoIution started and then "sbow them"; that the revolutionary stirrinp in other warring comtrie~were et of small c o w
quenm and the uprising in Russia could not ai them, but on the
am~trary,injure them, if it were not successful; that Petragrad had
rovisiom only for two or three days and that the insurrection would
Ee &med out; that the soldiers might turn against the Bolsheviks
if p a c e was not secured after the mizure of power; and, above all,
that the mama were not in the mood to go into the streets to fi ht
for power. The opposition, which still clung to their theory t f a t
the bourgeois-democratic revolution had not run its c o u w warned
that the attempted u rising would spell disaster to the Party and
arrest the prograa o the revolution.
Only one week was required to completely demolish the defeatiet
arguments of Kameaev and Zinoviev. Lenin was at the helm and
he was deer& the revolution on its appointed course and the
BoIshevik Party toward the fulfilment of its wpreme !a& and duty
to the Ruasian and international proletariat. On November 6th
he wrote that 'Cunder no drcmnstanm is power to be left in
the hands of Kerensk and Co. until the 7th, by no means!--but
that the matter must a aoluteIy be decided this evening or tonight"
Hayin masted the leaeon that "uprising is an art," and having
carried Lough ths necrsssry preparations, the various Bolshevik
or anisations moved with military precision at the command of the
hefmman, and power was transferred to the representatives of
workers, mIdiera and peasants, before the dawn of the 7th. The
Military Revolutionarp Committee which was in temporary control,
turned over all state power to the 2nd Congress of Sovieta, which
opened that day. The Soviet Government was formed, with k i n
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head of the first Socialist Soviet State.
The Bolshwik Party, first the leader of the advanced section of
the working c l w became the acknowledged poLitica1 leader of the
Soviet Republic. Steeled in the October dam it guided the eountty
as

through wunter-revoIution, famine, economic ruin, and sabotage,
to victqr over all the internal enemies of the revolution, to a firm
rule of e proletatian and p a a n t m
d e foundation for tbe
building of Socialism and for the establishment of a clamless society.

ti

ON THE EVE OF OCTOBER
MARXISM AND UPRISING
AMONGthe moat vicioue and perhape most widwpread distortions
of Marxism practiced by the prevailing "Smialist" parties, is to be
found the opportunist lie which says tbat preparations for an up*
ing, end generally the treatment of an u p w as an art, is "Blan-

d=*

B d , the Ieader of opportunism, long since gained sad
notoriety by accusing Marxism of Blanquism; and our pr-t
opporhmhts, by shouting about Blanqubm, in reality do not in any
way improve or "enrich" the meagre "ideas" of Elernstein.
To amuse Marxists of Blanqub for treating uprising as an art!
Can there be a more flagrant distortion of the tnrth, when there t
not a single Marxist who denies tbat it was Marx who e q d
h i d f in the most ddnite, precise and categorical manner on thii
=re; that it waa Marx who called uprising nothing but an art,
who mid that uprising mud be treated as an art, &a& one must
gdn the first s u m and then p
d from aucceas to sacma without stopping the oflendwe againat the enemy and making use of hia
confusion, etc., e.k
To be s u d u 1 , the uprising must be Based not on a oonspiracy,
not on a party, but on the advanced c k This is the fmt point.
The
must be based on the revoIntionary upsurge i f the
p p 1 e . This is the second point. The upriaing must be based on
the cmcid
in the h i ~ryo of the maturing revolution, when the
activity of the vanguard of the people ia at its height, when the
d & t w m in the ranks of the enemies, md in the ranks of the weuk,
h a l f - h d , d e & d f r i e n d s of the revol&n are at M r higheat point, This ia the third point. It is in pointing out &me tbree
conditiolla as the way of approaching the qaestiatl of an uprising,
that Marxiam differs from Blaaquim.
'Tho teacbinp o f the French ravolntiunist, Angum Blunqni (1805-188x3
ths overthmP of the &g poaa through secrat plota of a few
d n t l o n k n rethw thpn dmwh prepmion and arganiation af the manem
led bp r rsrrolonionarg partf.-Ed
II

0 n e a ~ ~ I I ~ ~ e x i 8 t , h t o d I & t b t r e a t h ~ p

~~ and the ~evo1utim.

moment mad he r a m p i d as the one
the party to mmgnbe the upaa
of the day by the c o r n of objective events, md
an art--to &ow this, ft will perhaper be best to
of comparison and to draw a paralId k m e m July
a d the Sap*
daya*
July 1617 it was poeaible, withe* tnmpadrg against h
to put the -tion
dm: it wouId ham
more proper
power, aiace OIM enemies would anyway m s e ue of moIt

R

power at that t h e , because there wew. still lading the ob
mditions for a victorioas tapriskg.
sl3. 'Wedid not yet have W d w the clam that is the vangaard
the revohtioa We did mot yet have a majority among the
m b and ddiers of the ca@&.
Now we have a majority in
' && Smi&
It was created only by the h i m of J d y and A
@,
hy dm -rim of ruthb. pmishmmt meted out to tbs BOIand by the experienca d the K d w affair.
At
that time &era WIU no gwrarel revoIutionary a p q e of
-3,
'&e pmpk Now there is, after fie Komilov affair. Thia hi prooen
by dm situation in the provinces and by the aehme of power by the
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-*innun*ld~
*&At that time thm were no twciU&m on a
general,
-1
scale among out
and moug tha undecided pettp
htqphb. NOW' the vacillations are enormws; rmr main eaemy,
dm h p d d h of the A I L aad of Qs -Id
(for the "Allid' are
at the head af world imperialium), haw hgau ta vaninate h w e m
*rat to a victory and a separate
against R d a . Om pettyk q p o h demrwra~having o b v i d y loat &sir majority among
&e p p t e , have begun to vacillate e n o d y , rejecting a bloc,
b.,a mIiti011with tha Cadek
4 This is why an uprising on July 16-17 d d have h n an
arror: we would not have rebined power sither physically or politldl?. Not phpically, in ~pittof the fact that at m
i
nm o w
btmgmd wau in our hI,baoatlse our workers and m l d i i would
~ h e v e f w r g l i t d d i t d a t t h a t t h f o r t h e a a k e o fhaldhgPetroa ~ ~ r a d ~ i n
~~~~

J d y d d m d a f ~ o f t h e K o m i l w
I

grad; at that h e people bad not yet become so "brutalid";
there was not in existen= such a burning hatred both towards the
Km*,
and towards h e Tmretelis and Chernovs; and our own
people were not yet hardened by the experience of the Bolsheviks
being persecutd, while the Socialist-Reuolutionarim and Men&&
v i b took part in the persecuting.
We could not have retained power July 1617 politically, for,
&fore the Kornibv aflair, the army and the pmhces could and
would have marched against Petrograd.
Now the picture ia entirely different.
We have back of us the majority of a class that is the vanguard
of the revolution, the vanguard of the people, and is capable of
drawing the massea along.
We have back of urn a majody of the people, for C k o v ' s resignation, far from being the o d y aign, is only the most striking, the
most outstanding sign showing that the peasantry will not receive
h d from a bloc with the S.-R's, or from the 5.-R.'s themdves.
And in this lies the essence of the popular character of the revolution.
We are in the advantageous position of a party which knows its
road PerfectIy well, while imperialism as a whale, as we11 as tbe
entire bloc of the M
e and the S.-R.'a, is vacillating in an
extraordmary mauner.
Victory is assured to us, for the people are now very close to
desperation, and we are showing
whole people a sure way out,
having demonstrated to the whoIe people the significance of our
leaderahip during the "Kornilov day%'' and then having oflered the
blbc pditicians a compromise which they rejected at r time when
heir vacillatiom continuid nninterruptedIy.
It would be a very great error to &ink that our compromim offer
haa not yet been rejected, that the demo^ Conference*' + still
m a y accept it. The compromise was offered from party to prties. It
could not have been offered othemim. The p a i e s have rejected it.
The h m a h Conference ia nothing but a conference. One muat
not forget one thing, namely, that this conference does not represent the majority of the revolutionary people, the poorest and most
embittered peasantry. One must not forget the self-evident truth
that this canference repremts a minority of the people. It would
Called by ths llEtreneltg governmeat in the attempt to wnre a broader bast
y bonrgeoiaie following the Kornilw revol+l.

among the m
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be a very great error, a vary great parIiamentary idiocy on oar part,
if we were to treat the Democfatic Conference as a parliament, for
erraa if it were to proclaim itself a parliament, the sovereign parliament of the revolution, it would not be able t o d e d e anythiag.
The decision lies oarde of it, m the workare' d o n e of Petrograd and Moscow.
We have before ue all the objective prerequisites for a au-fuI
apxiaing. We have the advantap of a situation where only our
h r y in an upriaing will put aa end to the most painfuI thing on
sarth, the vaeiIIations that have sickened tbe people; a ahation
where o d y our victory in an uprising wiU p u an end to the game
of a separate peace against the revolution by openly offering a more
camplete, more just, mom immediate peace in favour oJ the revoIntion.
Only our party, having won a victory in an uprising, con ~ a v e
Petrograd, for if our offer of p e w is rejected, and we obtain not
men s truce., then we shall becoma "defemskk," then we dm11 p h
oumlves at the head of the war patlbea, we sbdl be the most "warring" party, and we &all carry on a war in a truly revolutionary
manner. We aha11 take away from the capitalists all the bread and
all the ahw. We ahall leave them crumbs. We shall drea them
in in &shoes. We shall send all the bread aad aU the ahom to the
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And then we shall save Petrogrsd
The resourceg botb material and spiritua1, of a truly revolutionary war are still immense in Ruseia; there are ninety-nine chancm
in a hundred that the k a n a will at leaat grant us a truce. And
to sw a trws at p n a t a- to -guts the w ~ maru.
e
Having mgniaed the absolute d
y of an uprising of the
w o r h of ~ m g r . dl e d MOM
for the u ~ ofc saving the m o
lntion and of eaving Russia from being "qarately" divided among
the imperialists of both coalitions, we must f i adapt
~ our poIitica1
factia at the conference to the conditionsr of the maturing uprising;
mondly, we must prove that we accept, and not only in w o r k the
idea of Marx about the necessity of mthg uprising as an art.
At the eonfereuce, we must immediately consolidate the BoIahevik
f-on
without worrying about numbers, without being afraid of
-1
the vacillators in the camp of the vaciIlating: they are mom
8

d u I &re to the cause of revolution thtm in tbe camp of the rserr
lute and murageons fightere.
We mwt compose a brief dwlaration in the name of tha 1301.
shevika in which we sharply emphask the irrelevance of long
the irreIevanw of "speeches" generally, the n d y of
quick action to save the molution, the absolute n-ity
of breaking completely with the bourgeoisie, of rxrmpleteIy ousting the whole
preeent government, of completely severing relatiom with the AngloFrench imperial* who are preparing a "aepmte*' paffition of
h i a , the n e w d y of all power immediately passing into the h d a
of r e v o h i o m y democracy headed by the r e v o l prok~
fud.

Our declaration must be the briefat and sharpmt formulation
of this conclusion; it must connect up with the points in the programme of peace to the people, land to tbe peaganb, confiscation
of scandalous profita, and a balt to the scandalous d-e
to produdon done by the capitaliata.
The briefer, the sharper the declaration, the better. Only two
more important points muat be clearly i n d i d in it, namely, that
the people are tired of vaciIlationa, that they are tortured by the
lack of dedsivenees on the part of the S,-R.'s and Mensheviks; and
that we are definitely severing relatiom with these pwties h u a e
they have betrayed the revolution.
The other point. In offering an immediate peace without ammations, in breaking at once with the Allied imperialists and with all
imperialists, we obtain either an immediate truce or a going ovex
of the entire revolutionary proletariat to the side of defence, and
a truly j u g truly revolutionary war will then be waged by revolutionary democracy under the leademhip of the proletariat.
Having made tbis declaration, having appealed for decisbm and
not talk; for achns, not writing resolutions, we must pwh out
whole fraction into the factohs and barracks: itn place is there;
tbe pulw of life is there; the source of saving the revolution is
these; the moving force of the Democratic Conference is here.
In heated, inrpdoned speeches we must make our programme
clear and we must put tbe question thia way: either the conierenm
accepts it fully, or an uprising foflowa There is no middle course.
Delay is impoesible. The mo1ution b perishing.
Having put the quation this way, having w-ated
our entire
a

fraction in the factories and barracks, we shdl comscbIy esbimate
the bed moment to begin the uprising.
And in order t o treat uprising in a Marxist way, i.e., M an art,
we must at the same time, without losing a ahgle moment, organisa
the staff of the insurrectionary detachments; deaigaate tbe form;
move the loyal regiments to the moa impo-t
points; eurromd the
Alexander theatre; occupy Peter and Paul Fo-;
arrest the general at& and the government; move against the m i I i t q cadets,
the Wild Diviaioq* etc., such d e t a h t a as will die rather &an
allow the anemy to move to the rrentre of the city; we m u mobibe
tbe armed workem, d
I them to a lad &perate battle, m p y at
once tbe telqraph and telephone stations, place wr staff of the
upriaing at rhe cmtrd telephone station, m e c t it by wire with all
the factories, the regheats, the points of armed fighting, etc.
Of course, thia is a11 by way of an example, to illusgrate the idea
tbst at the present moment it is impossible to remain loyal to the
revolution without ~ e a t h gup*
~ r san

&.

Written Sepbmbm 26-27, 2917.
First pnblisbed in 1921 i n the ma&w
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TFE CRISIS KAS MATURED
T a m is no doubt that the beginning of October baa brought us
to the greatest turning point in the history of the Russian
cotding to all appearan% also of the world revolution.

and, ac-

The world workers' revolution ~tartedwith the actions of in&ddualr who, by their umweming courage, repraented everything
hone.& that has survived the decay of official "Socialimm,'' which is
in reaIity social&uvinim.
Iiebknaeht in Germany,Adler in Ant+
tria, MacLean in E n g I m d 4 m ~are the beet known nruaes of those
individual heroes wh3 took upon t h d l v e s the d X d t role of
forerunners of the worId revolution.
A second stage in the b o r i c preparation for this revolution wm
a broad maw ferment which dthe form of a qlit in the
officid @ea, the form of illegal publications and of etreet demonof
strations. The protest against the war g r e - a n d b e &n

The prisons of
w r i e s famed for tlteir lawfulness and even for their freedom,
Germany, France, Ttaly, England, began to be filIed with mree
and hundreds of internationalists, opponeats of the war, advoeate~
of a workerd revolution,
Now the third stage has come, which may be called the eve of the
revolution. Mass arrests of party leaders in free Italy, and particularly the beginning of mutinies in the German army, are undoubted symptoms of the great hrtning point, fie ayniptom of the
cue of revolution on a world scale.
There ir no doubt that even before this, there were in Germany
individual cases of mutiny in the army, but those cases were so
mall, BO isohted, so weak, that it waa possible to huh them up, to
pam over them in ailenc-d
tbis wae the main thing required to
check she mass contugian of seditions actions. Finally, such a move
mmt in the navy matured that it becams impossible either to hush
it up or to paas over it in silence, notwithtanding the aeverity of
victims of governmental persecutions aIm grew.
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the German military primn rggime, elaborated with unheard-of
mteness and followed with unbelievable pedantry.
There is no room for doubts. We are on the threshold of a
world proletarian revolution. And since we, R w s h Bolaheoiks,
alone out of all the proletarian internationalistn of all countrim,
enjoy comparatively great freedom, since we have aa open party,
a score or so of p a p a , since we have on our side the Soviets of
Workers' and SoIdhm' Deputies in the capitale, since we have on
our aide the majority of the m m s of the people in revolutionary
times, ro us may and must truly apply the famous dictum: he who
bas h given much shall have t o account for more.

II
In R
come.

h , the

tnrning point in the revolution has undoubtedly

In a peasant country, d e r a revolutionary republican government enjoying the support of the Socidist-Revolutionary and
M d e v i k Parties that only y d a y hdd sway among the pettybourgeois democracy, rr peasant uprising is growing.
It is incredible, but it is a fact
We Bolsbevike are not surprised by Lie fact; we have aIwaps
maintain4 that the government of the famed "coalition" with the
boi~rgeoisieL a government of betruyd of democracy and revolution, a government of imperialist slaughter, a government gmrding
the capitalists and landowners against the people,
Thanks to the deceptions of the S.-R.'s and Mensheviks, there baa
been and atilf r e d m i in Ruwia, under a qubIic and dating a
revolution, a government of capitalhs and landownera eide by eide
with the Soviets. Such is the bitter md formidable reality. Is
there any wonder that at the time when the prolongation of the
imperialist war and its consequences are causing the people unheardof misery, a peasant uprising has begun and is developing?
l a it any wonder that the opponents of the Bolsheviks, the leaders
of the ofEciaI S.-R. Party, the same party that
mpported dm
'%oaIition" all along, the same party that up to the Irtilt days or
last weeke had the majority of the people on its side, the same
@artythat continua to bIame and to hound the "new" S.-R's who
have r e a l i d that the coalition poIicy is betraying the intereet of
the peaaantgie it any wonder that them leaders of the official S.-R
19

In an editorial of theh official organ, the Dreb Narodu, I
October 12, wrote as follows:

Party,

Almost notbg has b a a dona up to the prssent time to da away with tho
bDndagc phtions that atill prevail in the village, particdarly in Central
Rda.
The law regulating the land relations in the village, a law that
has long been introduced into the Provisional Government, and ban men& h e purgatory of the Judicial Canferenoe, h a beerr hopelessly buried
in some quagmire of a b w u .
Are wt not right in d
g that o m
republican government i s far from having frced itself of the old habita of
the T d a administration, that the dead grip of Stolypin is atill strongly
felt in the methods of the d u t i o n a r y Ministwe?

.. .
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This is written by the &cia1 5.-R.'s! Just think of it: the adherents of a coalition are farced to admit that, in a peasant c
a
m
,
sevm montha after the revolution, "almoat notbing h a been done
to do away with the bondage relations" of the peasants, with their
being malaved by the landowners! Thae 3.-R.'s are forced to call

I

their colleague Kerensky, and all his band of Ministers, Stolypinists.
Can them be found more eloquent testimony coming from the
camp of our opponca& to corroborate not only the fact that the
coalition bas colIapaed, not only the fact tbat the ofiial S.-R's
who tolerate Kerensky have become au d n u t b n d , &peawrit,
counter-retrohdonury party, but a h o that the whole R u m h &YO.
lution haa reached a turning point?
A peasant uprising in a peasant country qainst the government
of Kerensky, the S.-R, of Nikitin and Gvmdev, the Membvika, and
other misterg representatives of capital and of the Iandowners'
iatwests! A euppresaion of this uprising by the republican government with rngitury meadttres!
In the face of such facts can one be a conscientious partisan of the
proletariat and at the m e time deny that the crisis has matwed,
that the revolution ia going through ita greatest turning point, that
the victory of the government over the peasant uprising at the p
~
time would be the death knell of the revolution, the h a 1 triumph
of Kormiloviam?

It k self-evident that if matters have reached ttme point of a
peasant uprising in a peasant country after wven months of a
democratic republic, this proves beyond dispute that the revo1ution
is suffering a collapse on a national scale, that it is p d g through
la

I

t

a crisis of unheard-of severity; that the counter-revolutionary forces
are approaching the hat ditchdcJb
This is self-evident. In the face of such a fact as the p e a m t
uprising, all the other political eymptoms, even if chey were to
contradiet this maturing of a national crbi wouId have no signsa c e whatsaever.
But all the symptom, on the contrary, indicate just U a t
the country-wide c h i s has m a d .
Afterthe agrarian qumtion, the national qumtion is of the p a t e s t
importance in the national life of Rue&, particu1arly for the petty.
bonrpin masaree of the population. And we see that at the "Democratic" Coaferenca packed by Messrs. Tsereteli and Go, the %tional" curia take the second place in radicalism, gieldiag only to
the trade d o n e and emesding the curia of the Soviets of Workers'
and sol dim^' Deputies by percentage of votee cast againsi the coalition (40 out of 55). 'ItPte gwemmmt of Kmmky, a government
mppreasiag the p a a n t uprising, is withdrawing the revolutionary
troops from Finland, in order to stmnghen the reactionary Finnhh bourgeoisie. In the Ukraine, the canflicb of the Ukrainians in
general and of the Ukrainian troops in particular, with the government are becoming more frequent.
Let US further Iook at the army, which fn war time is of a m p
tional importance in the whole life of the state. Ws have sem that
the Finnish army and the Mtic k t have entirely spla away from
the government. We hear the testimony of the officer Dubamv, not
a Bolshevik, speaking in the name of the whole front, and saying
ia a more revolutionary manner than the Bolsheviks that the soldiers will not fight any longer. We hear governmenta1 reports
~ y i n gthat the morale of the soldiers is Iow, that it is i m p o d l e
to guarantee "order" (LC, participation of these troops in supprwah g the peasant uprising). We witness finally the vote in Moscow
where fourteen thowand out of seventeen thousand oldier re voted for
the BoI&wiks.
Thiar voting in the elections to the borough councils in Moscow
is one of the most striking symptoms of a very deep change taking
place in the general mood of the nation. It is generally known
&at Moscow ia more petty-bourgeois than Petrograd. It is a fact,
many timep corroborated and undisputed, that the Moscow p r o b
tariat has a vastly greater number of conne~tionawith the village,
that it harbours mom sympathies and ir, c1oeer to the v
t vil14

fnge miment, than the Petrograd proletariat. And In Moscow the
votes cast for the S.-R.'e and Mensheviks dropped from 70 per cent
in June to 18 per cent at present. The petty bourgeoisie bas turned
away from the coaIition; the people have turned away from it;
there can he no doubt of this. The Cadets have incream3 their
strength from 17 to 30 per cent, but they remain a minority, a hopeIesa minority, notwithstanding the fact that they have been obvi.
oudy joined by the "Right" S.-R.'s and the "Right*' Men&&.
The Rzusks'ye Vyedumostn' says that the absoke number of votes
cast for the Cadets fell from 67,000 to 62,000. But the number of
votes cast: for the Bolsheviks grew from 34,000 to 82,000. They
received 47 per cent of the total number of votes. There can be
not the shadow of a doubt that, together with the Left S.-R.'a, we
have at present a majority in the Soviets, in the array, and in dre
cowry*
Among the symptoms that aerve not only as an indication but
have a significance in themselves, must be counted the fact that the
d e s of the railroad men and postal employees, which are of an
immense general economic, political, and military importance, continue to be engaged in a harp con&ct with the governmenb while
ewn the Menshevik defensiata am dissatisfied with "their own"
Minister Mikitin, and the official S.-R.'s call Kerensky-and Co. "Stolyphh." Is it not clear that such "support" given to the governand S.-R.'s has only a negative meaning,
ment by the Menah&
if any?

Yes, the leadem of the Central Executive Committee are pursuing
whoee sole logic
the defenw of the bourgeoisie md
landowners. And there is not the slightest doubt that the Bolsheviks,
were they to allow themselves to be caught in the trap of constitutional illusions, of "faith" in the Congress of Soviets and in the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, of "waiting" for the Congress
of Soviets, etc.-that such Bolsheviks would prove mhembk treC
tact&

tors to the proletarian caum.
They would be mitors to the cause, for they would have, by their
Chapter I V of thin article has tbw far not been located.-Ed.
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behaviour, h a y e d the Gennaa tevolutionary workem who have
Btarted s mutiny in ?he Beet. To "wait" for the Congress of Soviets, &., nnder such conditions means &&rayinginbernutbmlima,
betraying the cause of the internationa1 SockIist revoIution.
For internationalism consists not in phrases, not in protestations
of mlidarity, not in inIations, but in beds.
The Bolshwiks would be trsitora to the pmmtryl for to tolerate
the supprwion of !he peasant nptisiag by a government which m n
the Dyela N u ~ d acompares with Stolypinista means to destroy the
whole rwoIution, to destroy it forever and irrevocably. They shout
about anarchy and about the increasing apathy of the mas=. Why
shouldn't the rnbe apathetic in the elections when the peasantry has h e n driven to an uprasirag, while the soalled a'revolutionary democracy" patientIy tolerates the suppmion of the pea+
ants by military force11
The Balshevika would prove traitors to democracy and freedom,
for to tolerate the suppmsion of a peasant uprising at the present
moment ~ U I L to
S a'tlow the eIectiom to the Constituent Assembly to
be fixed in just the m e wllly-and even worse, more crudely--as
the "Democratic Conferenm" and the "pre-parliament" have been

fmd
The crisis has matured. The whole future of the Huwian RevoIutim is at stake. The whole honour of the Bo18hevik Party is in
m i o n . The whole future of the international workers' revohtion for Smialism is at stake.
The crhb has matured.

...

Written Octobw 12, 1917.

Mn.-Ed.]
hrbliab up to here; what follow^ ia to be &tribd among ths msmbae
of the Central Committee, The Pttmgtad Gmmittee, the Mwrcow Committee,
and the Sohe.
[Note by

#at,
then, is to be done? We must awprechsn, t a m ist, "say
what is," admit the truth, that in our Central Cornmitt& and at the
top of our party L e r e is a tendency in favour of awaiting the Congem of Soviets, againss the immediate &mre of power, again&
k immediate uprising. We must owermme thb tendency or
opinion.
10

.

Otbthe Bolahdw would cwer themelves with h e
lorever; tbey would be reduced to nothing aa a party.
For to m h snch a moment and to '(await" the Congress of Soviets
is either a b s o l ~ eidiocy or complete betrayal.
It ia a complete betrayal of the German workers. Meed, we
must not wait for che begin*
of their revolution ! I When it be* &, even the Liberdane * will L i
n favour of "supporting'' it. But it
can- begin ae long as Ktrensfcy, Kishkia and Co, are in power.
It is a comp?ete betrayal of the peasantry. To have the Soviets
of both c u p i d s and to allow the upriaii of the peasants to ba mpp r e d means to lose, a d j d y so, all the confidence of the peasant; it means to become in the eyes of the peasants equal ta the
Lihrdans and other scoundreIs.
To "await" the Congress of Soviets is a h l u t e idiocy, for this
means losing weeks, whereas weeks and even days now decide m y
thing. It means timidly to refuse the seizure of power, for on November I415 it will be impossibIe (both politically and technically,
since the Cossrtcks will be mobilised for the day of the f o o I i i
"appointed" ** nprieing)
To "await" the Cwgrw of Soviets ia idiocy, far the Congress
will gim nothing, it can @ue nothifig!
The *moraI" importance? S m g e indeed! The " i m p o ~ ' '
of rmlutiona end negotiations with the Liberdans wsen we h o w
that the Soviets are in favour of the peaaamts and tbat the peasant
uprising is being suppressed!! Thus, we will reduce the Swiets
to the role of miwabIe chatterers. First vampish KarenSy, then
ca1I the Coogreas.
The victory of the u p e g is now secure for the Bolsheviks: (1)
we can +* (if we do not "await" the Soviet Congrw) launch a
sudden attack from three points, from Feirograd, from' Moscow,
from the Baltic fleet; (2) we have dogans whose support is guaranteed: down with the government that suppressee the uprising of
the peasants againat the landowners! (3) we have a majority in the

.

A contraction of the

names of

leading M e d m Lib= and Dm-Ed.

** To "can" the Congress of Soviets for November 2. io order to d d d e u p ~ a
tbs aeixtrre of pow=-is
there any d8erenee butween this and a f w r i

"appointed" uprising? Now we can aeim gowar, dsreae No&
211 gon
will not be allowed to mim it.
*** What has the pa* done by way of studring the lacation of the m a ,
artw?
etc.? What has it done for the carryin# out of tbe uprising as
OnIp talk in the Central Cornmitree, e k l l
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country; (4) complete disorganiaation of the Menshevilrs and
S.-R.'a; ( 5 ) we are technically in a position to seize power in M w
cow (which might even ba the one to atart, so as to deal the enemy
a surprise blow); (6) we have showads of armed workwe and
aoldiers in Petrograd who can eei%e once ?he Winter Palace, the
General Staff Building, the teIepbone exchange and aU the largest
printing e s t a b b e n k They will not be able to drive us out from
there, whereas there wiU be such propaganda in the army that it
wit1 be impossibk to fight against this government of peace, of
land for the peasantar, etc.
If we were to attack at once, soddenly, from three points, in
Petrograd, Moarcow, and the Baltic fleet, there are ninety-nine out of
a hundred &an=
&at we would gain a victory with fewer victim
than on July 16-18, becam the troop8 will raot advance against the
government of peam. Even if Kerensky has d r d y "loyal" cayalry, etc., in Petrograd, when we attack from two eides and when
the army is in sympathy with us, Kerensky will be compelled to
surrender. If, with chances like the present, we do not ~ e power,
k
hen all talk of Soviet rule becomes a lie.
To refrain from seizing power at present, to "wait,n t, " & a W
in the Central Committee, to conhne ourselves to "fighting for the
organ" (of the Soviet), to "fighting for the Congress," meam to
ruin the rwol&'on.
S n g that the Central Committee has left even withmi an
answer my writings imiithg on such a policy since the beginning
of the Democratic Conference, that the Central Organ is dekting
from my articles referen- to such glaring errors of the BoUeviks
as the shameful decision to
&I the pre-parliament, as
giving seats to the Mensheviks in the Pmidium of the Soviets, etc.,
etc-seeing
all hat, I am compelled to recognise here a "gentle"
hint as to tbe unwillingnese of the Central Committee even t o consider this qu&on, a gentle hint at gagging me and at suggating
that I retire,
I am compelled t o tender my resigndon from the Central Corn
miuee, which I hereby do, leaving myself Dhe freedom of propaganda
in the b w e r rorrks of the party and at the Party Conpas.
For it is my deepemt conviction that if we "await" the Congrass
of Soviets and let the present moment paw we ruin the revolution.

P.S. A d o h seriea of fa- has proven that even the k c k
troop wiH not move againat the gwefnment of peace! And how
many are they? Where are they? And will not the entire army
delegate unita in our favour?
C h a p b ~1-IU a n d V, pubuahed in the Rabocliy Put,
1917. Qlapttr VI pablhhod in 1925.

No. 30, October 20,

A IElTIR TO BOISHEVIK COMRADES PARTICIPATING IN
THE REEIONAL CONGRES OF THE SOWETS OF THE
NORTHERN REGION

COMRADES! Our revolution is passing through a highly critical
crisiar coincides with the great criair of a growing worldwide SociaIim revolution and of a struggle against it by world
imperialism. The responsible leaders of our party are confronted
with a gigantic task; if they do not carry it out, it will mean a
total colhpae of the iate~nationaliiproletarian movement. The
situation is such h a t delay truly means death.
h k at the international sitnation. The growth of an international revolution is beyond dispute. The outburst of indignation
among the C z d wokera has been r u p p r d with unbelievable
bmtality, which indicates that the government is extreme1y frightened. In Italy thing& have come to a mass upheaval in Turin.
Moet important, however, is the mutiny in the German navy.
You must picture to yourselves the enormous diEculties of a revolution in a eormtrp lilre Germany, especially under the present
circumstances,. It cannot h doubted that the mutiny in the German
navy is a eign of the great crisis of the rjsihg world revolution.
While our chauvinists who preach Germany's defeat demand a audden riof the German workers, we Ruaeian revolutionary internationalists know from the experience of 1905-1917 that one
cannot imagine a more imposing sign of a rising revoIutioa than
a mutiny among the mops.
Think of what position we now find ourselves in before the German revolutioniarta. Thev can tell us, UWe have one Liebknecht
who openly calIed for a revolution. B
i voice has been stifled
behind iron bars. We have not a single paper a p l y to bring out
the n e e d y of a revohtion; we have no freedom of assembly. We
have not a aingle Soviet of Workers' or Soldiers' Deputies. Our
voice hardly reaches the red broad masses. Still, we have made
an attempt at upriaig, havhg perhaps one chance in a hundred.
BU; you, Russian revolutionary internationalists, have behind you
time.

PI0

half a year of free propaganda; yon have a more of papwe;
you have a number of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; yon have gained the upper hand in the S o v i a of botb capitals;
you have on your side the entire BaItic fleet and all the Ruaeian
troop in Finland, and dl1 you do not respond to our call for an
uprising, you do not overtbrow your imperialist Kerensky when you
have ninkty-aiae chances in a hundred of seeing your uprising
victoTious."

Yes, we shall be real betrayera of the International i&at such
moment, under such favourable conditions, we reply to such a
call of the German revolutionists by mere reaolutiana.
Add to it &at we all h o w perfectly d l of the rapid growth
a

of plotting and conspiracy of the international imperialists agamst
he Russian Revolution. To stifle it at any price, to stifle it both
by military meamwee and by a peace at the expenee of Russia-&
is what international imperialism approaches ever closer. This ia
what particularly gharpeas the crisis of a world-wide S o c i a l i ~revolntioi; this is what renders our h&tancy in the matter of an uprising particnlarIy dangerous-1 would ahoat say criminal.
Take, further, the internal situaGon of R d . The b a n h p k y
of the petty-bourgeois conciliation parties that exprw the unconwious confidence of the masees in Kerenaky and the imperialists in
general, ia an obvious fact, Tbat h h u p t c y is complete. The
voting of the Soviet delegation at the Democratic Conference against
a coalition, the voting of a mujo*
of local Soviets of Pmsant
Deputim fin spite of their Central Soviet where the Avksentyeve and
other friends of h e n s k y ' s are seated) against a coalition, the elections in Moscow where the working population is closest to the
peasantry and where over 49 per cent voted for the Bolarhevika (and
among tbe soldiers fourteen out of seventeen housand)--doesn't
alI this mean a total collapse of the confideace of the massea of the
people. in Kerensky and tbe conciiiatora headed by Kerensky and
Co.? C m you imagine &at tbe m a w s of the peopIe could say
still more clearly than they said to the Bolahevike by this vote,
"Lead us, we'll follow you"?
And we, having thus won the majority of the masses of the people
to our side, baving conquered tbe Sovid of both the capit&, shaU
we wait? What for? Wait till Kerensky and his K o d o v i e t
generals deliver Petrograd to the Germana, thus entering, directly
or indirectly, openly or covertly, into a conspiracy both with
91
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Buchanm and WiIbelm to completely stifle the Russian RevoIntioa?
That the people, by the Moscow vote and by the reelections t o
the Soviets, have expressad confidence in us, is not the whole story,
There are signs of a growing apathy and bd8erence. This is easily
understood. It means, not an ebbing of the revolntion, aa the Cadets
and their henchmen declare, but an ebbiing of confidence in reeolution~and electiom In a revolution, he masea demand of the leading parties action, not words; victories hi the strsggle, not talk.

The moment is drawing near when the opinion m a y develop among
the people that the BoIiwiks are no better than the others, since
they do not know how to act when conlidem in them is ex-

...

pressed.
Throughoat the whole country, the pasant uprising is flaring
up. It ia perfectly clear that the Cadets and their sateILites are
minimising it in every way, reducing it, as they do, to "pogroms" and
4t
anarchy." This lie is refuted by the fact that, in the centres of b
uprising, the land i given over to the peasants; never have "pogroms' and "anarchy" led to euch splendid political results! The
tremendous power of the peasant uprising ia proven by the fact tha
both the cwciIiatora and the Socialist-Revolutionariesin the Dye&
Narada, and even Breshko-Breshkovskuya have begun to speak of
giving the land to the peasants, in order to stop the mowmeat before
it has engulfed them.
Shall we wait until the h c k mita of the Kornilovist Kereneky
(who jwt now baa been exposed as a Kornilovist by the S.-R.'a
themselves) have d e d in suppressing thia peasant uprising
pkcentecrl?
It seems that many leaders of oar party have not noticed the
specific meaning of &at slogan which we a11 recog&d and r e
peated without end. This slogan is, "MI Power to the Soviets."
There were periods, there were moments during a half year of revolution, when this slogan did not mean uprising. Those perioda and
thoee momenta seem to hava blinded some of our comradea and
made them forget that, at preeent and for us, at lmst b@mhg from
the middle of September, thb slogan is zantamaun6 to a d l so
uprising*
There can be not the shadow of a douh about thie. The Dyelo
Narada recently explained this "in a popular way" when it said:
'Kereasky will never submit!" Of c o u w not!
The slogan, "AU Power to the Soviets!" is nothing but a call to
aa

nprfeing. The bhme will fall on as, fully and unmnditionally,
if we, who for months h v e called the masses to uprising, to re
padiating conciliation, fail to lead thorn mato an uprising on
the eve of a collapse of the revolution, after the maswar have exp
d their confidence in us.
The Cadets and condiatcrrs try to scare us with the example of
July 16-18, with the growth of Black Hundred propaganda, etc.
3til1, if any miataZre was made on July 26-18, it was only that we
did not &ze power. I think &at this was not a mistake at that
time, for at that time we were not yet in ti majority; at present,
however, this would be a fatal mistake, it would be worse than a
mistake. The growth of Black Hundred propaganda is easily understood as a sharpening of the extremes in the atmosphere of a deveIoping proletarian and pmsant revolution. But to make of this an
argument against an uprising is ridiculous, for the impotence of
the Black Hundreds, bribed by the capitalists, the impatence of de
Black Hundred8 in the struggle, d w not even require any proof.
In a struggle, Kornilov and Kerensky can have the support only of
the "Wild Divizlion" and *the Cosaacka At present, demoralisation
bas set in a h among the Coma&; U e s , the peasants are threatening them with civil war within their Cossack territories.
X am writing thew l i n a on Sunday, October 21. Yon will read
them not earlier than October 23. 1 have heard from a
comrade that people travelIing on the Warsaw railroad say, " K e r d y
is leading the Cosaacka to Petrograd"! This is perfectly plaudIe,
and it wiIl be our direct fault if we do not verify it camfully and
stady the strength and the distribution of the Kornilwist koops of
the second dm/#.

Kerendiy has again brought the Kornilovist troops before Petrograd in order to prevent the passing of power to the Soviets,in order
to prevent the immediate offer of peace by this power, to prevent
giving the whde land to the peasantry immediately, in order to
deliver Petrograd to tbe Germans while he himself runs off to Mos
cow! This is the eIogan of the uprising which we muet circulate ae
wideIy as possible and which will have tremendous success.
We must not wait for tbe AIl-Ru&an Congress of Sovie, w h i i
the Central Executive Committee may postpone till November; we
muat not tarry, meanwhile allowing k e n s k y to bring up still more
Kornilovist troopa Finland, the fleet, and Revat are represented at
the Congress of Soviets. Thorre, together, can bring about an im18

mediate movement tawarda Petmgrad and .againat the Komiloviat
regimen& a movement of the fleet, the artillery, the machine guaa
and two or three army corps, such as have proven in Vyborg all
their hatred for the Kornilovbt generals with whom Kerenaky is
again in collusion.
It would be the greateat error if we failed to seize the opportunity to bmak up at once the Kornilovist regiments of the second
draft, for fear that, in leaving for Petrograd, the Baltic &et might
expose the front to the Germans. The slanderous Kornilovists will
my this, as they will tell any lie at all, but it is not worthy of
revolutionists to be frightened by lies and slander. K e r d y will
deliver Petrograd to the Germans, &is is now a? clear as daylight;
no assertion to the contrary can shake our full conviction that it is
ao, because it followa from the en&
course of events and from all
of Kerendcy's policies.
Kerenaky and the Kornilovh will deIiver Petrograd to the Germans. In order to save Petrograd, Kerensky muat be overthrown
and power must be &idby the Sovim of both c a p h b These
Soviets will immediately offer peace to all the peoples and thereby
fulfil their duty More the German revolutionists; they will thereby
make a decisive step toward5 frustrating the criminal conspiracies
against the Russian holution, the conspiracies of international
imperialism.
Only the immediate movement of the Baltic fleet, of the Finnish
troopq of Reval and Kronatadt against the Kornilovist tzoops near
P&ograd, is capable of saving the Russian and the world revolution. Such a movement has ninety-nine chances in a hundred of
bringing about withi a few days the surrender of one section of the
Coseack troops, the deetrnction of another section, and the overthrow of Kerensk~, since the workers and the eoldisrs of both
capitals will support such a movement.
Delay means death.
The slogan, "All Power to the Soviets!" is a dogan of uprising.
Whoever wea this slogan without meaning uprling, without considering npriaiag, let him bIame himself. W e must be able to treat
uprising aa an art-n
this I insisted during the Democratic Conferenw, on thia I insist now, because this is what Marxism teaches
us, this is what the present situation in Russia and in the whob
world teach- us.
It is not a question of voting, of attracting the "Left Socialist24

Revolutionarim? of gaining additional provincial Soviets, of hotdmg the congress. It ia a weetion of an uprising which can and
must be decided by Petrograd, Mowow, Helaingfors, Cronstadt,
Vyborg and RevaI. Near Petrogrod and in Petrograd-this b where
thia uprising can and must be decided upon and carried out as
earnestly as pwible, with as much preparation as ~ ~ 1 ase
quickly as possible, as energetically as poesible.
The fleet, Gonatadt, Vybarg, Reval, can and must advance on
Petrograd, crush the Kornilov regiments, arouse huh capitals, tart
a maw agitation for a power which would immediately give the land
to the peasants, immediately offer peace, overthrow Kerensky's government, create such a power.
Delay means death.
Wriuen October 21, 1917.
Fit published No&
7,1925, in h & r , No. 25!5 (3186).
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LETTER TO COMRADES
COMRADES,
the time we are passing through ia no critical, events
msh with such incredible a w i f m that a publicist, placed by the
wiII of fate somewhat aaide from the main stream of history, canscantly risks either being late or proving uninformed, especially if
his writing appear in print after a l a p of time. Though realbing this fully, I am still f o r d to address this Ietter to the BaIsheviks, even nnder the risk that it may not be published at all, for
the vacillationa against which I deem it my duty to warn in the most
decisive manner are of an unprecedented nature and are capable
of exercising a ravaging d e c t on the party, the movement of the
international proletariat, and the revolution. As for the danger of
being too late, I will prevent it by indicating what information and
of what date I po-.
It was only on Monday morning, October 29, that I saw a comrade
who had on the previous day participated in a very important Bolshmrlt gathering in Petrograd, and who informed me in detail about
the discussion. T6e subject of d i d o n was the name g u d o n of
the uprising, which is also discussed by tho Sunday papers of all
poIiti-1 trends. At the gathering there was represented all that is
moat iduential in all branches of Bolshevik work in the capital.
Only a most insignificant minority of the gatbering, n d y , dl
in all two comrades, had taken a negative stand. The arguments
which those comrades advanced are so weak, the arguments are
the manifestation of aruch an aetounding confusion, timidity, and
collapse of a11 the fundamenta1 ideas of BoIshevism and revolutionary-proletarian internationalism that it is not easy to discover an
explanation for such 8hamefuI vacillationa 'The face nevertheless
is there, and since the xevolutionary party h(a no right to tolerate
vacillations in such an earnest qumtion, as this littla pair of comrades, who have scattered their principles b the winds, might c a n e
a certain coafuaion of mind, it is necessary to analyse their a r p
ments, to expose their vacillation; to &ow how ahmefa1 they are.
The following bee will be an attempt at cawing out this iask
ae

.

We have no majwity among
@dng & h o p e l m . .

.

ths p p l e , and withoat this wndition the

Men capable of a y h g this are eiLher distorters of the truth or
plants who at all even&, without taking the least m r m t of the
real: circumstanoes of the revoIution, wish to -re
an advance gnarantee that the Bolshevik Party has received throughout the whole
cornby no more nor Iese than omhalf of the votes plne one. Such
a gaarmtee histc. j hrts never proffed, and k absolutely in no
poaitim to proffer in any revolution. To advance such a demand
means to mock one's audience, and h nothing but a cover to hide
one's own flight from reality.
For reaIity shows us palpably that it was after the July days that
the majority of the people began quickly to go over to the aide of
the Bolsheviks. This was demonstrated first by the Septmbr 2
elections in Petrograd, even before the Kornilov &air, when the
BoMievik vote roae from 20 to 33 per cent in the city not including
the suburbs, and also by the elections to the borough
in
Mowow in September, when the Bolahmik vote rose from 11 to 49%
pex -t [om Moscow comrade, whom I saw r e a d y , told me that
ths correct figure i~ 51 per cent). This was proven by the new e h tioas to the Soviets. It was prwen by the fact that a majority of the
peasant Soviets, the " A v h t y e v w central Soviet notwihhmding,
bm e x p d i h l f against the coaIition. To be against the coalition
mema in prectioe to foIlow the Bolshevik Furthermore, reports
from the front prove more and more often and &finitely that the
soIdiers are passing en ltiasse over to the side of the Bolsheviks
more and more decisively, in r p h of the malicious slanders and
attacks by the S o c i a l i s t - R e v o l u t i o ~ M e v i kleadem, o
h
deputies,
etc,
Last, bat not lea&, the mmt outstauding f a d m the present h a tim b the reoroh oJ the pewmtty. Here is m objective passing over
of the people to the aide of the Bolehedm, shown not by words but
by deeds. For, notwithstanding the lies of the bourgeois p t w and
its mimrable henchmen of the "vacilIahg" N m a p Z&n and Co.,
and their wails about pogrom and anarchy, the fact ia there. The
movement of the peasants in Tambov provine waa an uprising both
ia the material and poIitical sense, an uprising that bas yielded
such splendid poIitica1 d t s ag in the first plam, permission to
give &a land to the peasants. It is not for nothing that the S.-R

~~
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rabbIe, including the Dyeb Noruda, frightened by the uprising,
now screams about the n m i t y of giving over the lands to the
peasants. Here is the demonstration of the cormctnea of Bolsbevism and its success, irt deeds. It h a turned out to be impossible
to "teach" the Bonapartiats and their lackeys in the pmparIiament
othenvise than by means of an uprising.
This $B a fact. Facts are stubborn things And such a factual
"argument" in favour of an uprising is stronger thm thousands of
"pessimistic" evasions on the part of c o n f d and frightened politicians.
uprising were not an event of nation-wide political
If the
import, the S.-R. lackeys from the pre-parliament would not be
shouting about the n m i t p of giving over the land to the peasants.
Another splendid politicaI and molutionary msequence of the
peasant uprising, as already noted in the Rabochy Pu, is the delivery of grain to ,the railroad stations in the Ta&v
province;
Here is another "argument" for you, confused gentlemen, an a r p
meni in favour of the uprising aa the only means to save the country
from the famine that knocks at our door and from a crisis of unheard-of dimensions, Whib the S.-R.-Menshevik betrayers of the
peopIe are grumbling, threatening, writing resolutions, promising to
feed the hungry by convoking the Constituent kssembly, the people
are beginnmg to mIve the h a d question Bobhevik-fashion, by rebelling qainst the landownere, capitalists, and speculators.
The wonderful results of such a solution (the only real solution)
of the bread question, even the bourgmis preM, men the RmskQya
Volya,
compeIIed to admit by way of publishing information
to the effect that the railroad stations in Tambov province were
swamped with grain
after the peasants had revolted!!
No, to doubt now that the m j o r i r y of the people is following
and wiII follow the Bolshevlh means shamefully to vacillate and
in practiw to throw overboard all the principles ef proletarian
revolutiouim, to renounae Bolshevism completely.

...

We are not m n g mngh m seiEe power, and the borrrgdde i s not
to hind@ the caIling of the Constituent hembly.

~trong

emu&

The &st p k t of this argmmt is a simple paraphrase of d\s
preceding argument. It does not gain in strength and convincing
pbwer, when the confusion of its authors and their fear of the boargeoisie is e x p r d in terms of pessimism concerning the workers
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and optimism concerning the bourgeoisie. If the military cadet3
and the Cuesachi say that they will fight against the Bolsbevib to
the last drop of their blood, thia deserves full credence; if, however,
the w o r k and soldiers at hundreds of meetings expm full confib=in the Bolshevilre and af6rm their readinw to stand fast for
the passing of power to the Soviets, &en it Is ''timely'' to d that
voting is one thing and fighting another!
Of comm, with &is kid of argument, the uprising is Utduted."
But the question ia, wherein does this peculiarly conceived and
peculiarly orientated Upmhism" differ from a political shift to
the side of the bourgeoisie?
Look at the facts. b
&
the Botshevik decIarationa, repeated thousands of times and now "forgotten" by our pemhbta.
We have said thowands of times that the Soviet% of Workers9and
SoIdiers' Deputies are the power, that they are the vanguard of the
revolution, that they can take power. Thousands of times have we
upbraided the Menahevilra and S.-8,'s for phrm-mongering concerning the "pl&potentiary o r g m of democracy" and at the same
time for being ajrakl to t r a d e r power to the Soviets.
And what has the Kornilov affair p r o m ? It has proven that the
Soviets are a real power.
And, now, after hh has heen proven by experience, by facta, we
shall repudiate Bolshdsm, deny onreelv~,and my: we'are not
strong enough (a1th-b
we have he Soviets of both capitals and
a majority of the provincial Soviets on the side of the Bolahevh) I !!
Are these not shameful vacillations? As a matter of fa* our
"
~ throw overboard
"
the slogan of "All power to the
Sodeta,'' though they are afraid to admit it.
How can it be proven that the bourgeoisie is not suficient1y strong
ta hinder the calling of the Constituent Amembly?
If the Soviets have no^ the power to o v e r h o w the bourgeoisie,
this means t h 4 the latter is strong enough to hinder the calling of
the Constituent h b l y , for there is nobody to prevent it from
doing this. To trust the promim of Kereneky and Co., to trust
the rem1utions of the pre-parliament lackeyeis this worthy of a
member of a proletarian party and a revolutionist?
Not only has the bourgeoisie power to hinder the '
&of the
Constituent A d l y , if the present govenunent is not ovedmwn,
but it can a h idirectdy achieve this resnrlt by surrendering Petrog a d to the Gemam, by laying the front open, by inming l&

aQ

outs, by sabotaging delivariea of t o o d d s . It han been proven by
facts that, t~ a oertain extent, the hrgeoiaie has already been do@
all t h i ~ . That means that it is cap& of doing all this $0 drhe fdJ
extea, if the workers and soIdiers do not overthrow it.
The Sovieta mtmt be a &m
pointed at the tample of dm govtmmemt
with rhe damand of mmking the Conntituent ABaemblj and renouncing
Kamilovkt p l o a

Thia is how far one of the two sad p&mbts has gone.
He had to go that far, for t o renounce the uprising means
renounce the slogan of "AU power to the Soviets."

to

Of cotme, a slogan b "not a sanctuary"; we aU agree to that.
But then why has no one raised the *&ion of changing his slogan
(in the same way ar f raiaed that question after the July days) P
W h y be a/& to say it openly, in ~piteof the fact that the question
of the uprising, which ia now W i s p e m b k for the realisation of the
dogan, "All power to the Soviets," has been discussed in the party
IB-

Septh?

wiIl never he able to d a t e themdm in
this respect. A renunciation of the uprhbg is a renunciation of the
passing of power to the Sovieta and a %ansfer" of all h o p and
expectations to the kind bourgeoisie, which haa "promised" to convoke the Constituent Assembly.
I it so &ult to understand that once power in in the hands of
the Soviets, the Constituent A d l y and ih success ire guaranteed?
The Bolsheviks have mid so thousands of time. No OM bas ever
attempted to refute this. Everybody has r e c o p i d m& a "Cambind type," but to gmuggIe in a renunciation of giving the power
to the Sovids under the guise of the words "combined type,'' t o
smuggle it in secretly while fearing to renounce our dogan openly
-what is &is? Can one find a p s r b t a r y expreaeion to chara m i s s it?
Some one baa very pointedly retorted to w r p h b t : "A rn
volver without bullets?" If so, it means directly going over to the
Lixdaas, who have declared the Soviets a "revoIvern thousmda of
times and have deceived the people thouaan& af times. For wR&
$hqh u e hem in control the Soviets have proven to ba q aullitg.
If, however, it ia a molver %
bull&,"
i&then &it io a wIcnical preparation for aa u p r k g . For the bullet has to be p r d
the-revolver hae to b 1011ded-d one bullet alone wouldn't lm
enough.
Our sad peseimista
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Either joining

the side of the Liberdans and openly renouncing
power to the S-ar,"
or an uprising.

the slogan "AU
There is no middle mum.

Tho banrgeohie cannot aturendm Petrograd to the Cermana, although
Rodzyanko wants to, for the fighting is done not by the bonrgmkie, but by
our heroic d o =

Thia 'argument again reduces itseIf to the same 'bptimiam" concerning the bourgeoisie which is fatally manifested at every step by
those who are pessimistic regarding the revolutionary forces and
capabilities of the proletariat.
The fighting is done by the heroic sailors, but this did not prevent
h ~ admirala
b
from dippearing before the capturn of Esel!
This ia a fact. Facts are stubborn things. The facts prove that
the admirals are apable of treachery no less than Kornilov. That
General Headquarters has not been reformed, and that the commanding stail is Kornilovist, are undisputed facts.
If the Kornilovista (with Kerensky at their head, for he is aIso a
KorniIovist) want to surrender Petrograd, they can do it in two or
even in three ways.
Fimt, they can, by an act of treachery of the KorniIovist commanding staff, open the northern land front,
Second, they rn "agree" concerning freedom of action for the
entire German fleet, which is stronger than we are; h e y can agree
both with the German and with the English imperialiste. MGeover,
the admirals who have dippeared may a h have delivered the p h
to the GemThird, they can, by means of lockouts, and by sabotaging the delivery of foodsMa, bring our troops to complete &peration and
impotence,
Not a single one of them three ways can be gainsaid. The facts
have proven that the bourgeois-Cossack party of R w i a has already
knocked at a11 three of the= doom, that it has siea to open a11 of
them.
What follows? It followa that we have no right to d until the
bourgeoisie strang1~the revolution.
That R o & y d o t s wishes are no trifle has h e n proven by experience. R o c l q d o is a man of &airs. Behind Rodeganko stands
cupitat. This is beyond dispute. Capital is-a huge force aa long as
the proletariat does not have power. Rodzyanko has carried oat the
policies of capital, faithfully and truly, for decades,
81

What follow? It followar that to vacillate in the @on
of an
uprising as the only means to save tbe revoIurion means to sink into
that half-liberdan, S.-R.-Menshevik cowardly confidence towards
tbe bourgeoisie, half "peasant-l&" anquestioning confidence, against
which the Bolsheviks have been battIing moet of alI.
Either fold your idre arma on your empty chest and wait, white
swearing "faith" in the Constituent M l y , until Rodzyanko and
Co. have surrendered Petrograd and atrangled the revolution, or an
uprhing. There is no middle course.
Even tbe convocation of the Constituent Assembly, taken mparateIy, does not b g e anything here, for no 4tconstitutioning,*no
voting of any arch-sovereign assembly wiII have any effect on the
famine, or on WilheIm. Both the convocation and the success of
the Constituent Assembly depend upon the passing of power to tha
Soviets. This old Bolshevik truth ia b e i i proved by reality ever
more strikingly and ever more cruelly.
W e are becoming atrongu every day. We can enter tho thstitaent h e m M a strung opposition; why ahould we stake everything?

bly

Thb is the argument of a philistine who has "read" that the Constituent h m b l y is b e i i called, and who conhdently acquiesces in
the moat legal, most loyal, mod constitutional course.
It k only a pity that by tacrihg for the Constituent Asswnbly one
can solve neither the question of famine nor the question of surrendering Petrograd. This 'Ltrifle" is forgotten by the naive or the
confused or those who have aIlowed thimwlves to be frightened.
The famine will not wait. The peaaant uprising did not wait.
The war will not wait. The admirab who have disappeared did
not wait.
Will the famine agree to wait, became we B o l s h d proclaim
faith in the convocation of the Conatituent Assembly? Will the
admiraIs who have disappeared agree to wait? Will the MakIakws and Rodzyaakos agree to stop the Iockouts and the sabotaging
of grain deliveries, to abrogate the secret treaties with the English
and the German imperialists?
This is what the arguments of the heroes of "constitutional illusions" and parliamentary cretinism reduce themselves to. The Wing
reality disappears, and what remains is only a paper dealing with
the convocation of the Conatituent M l y ; what remains is only
elect i o m
8a

And blind people are still wondering w h y hungry people and
soldier8 betrayed by generals and admirals are indifferent to the
e l d o n s ! Oh, h c r e s !
If tbs KornfIoPiate were

things, then we would
beginning?

t o st@

why should we ourstlves risk

&OW

them!

But

This is unuwa1ly convincing and unusually revolutionary. History
d m not repeat itself, but if we turn our back to it, and, scrutiniaing
the fint Kor~~iIov
affair, repeat: "If the Komilovists were to start"
-if we do so, what exceIlent revolutionary ~trategy! How close it is
to "maybe and perhaps"! Maybe the Kornilovists will tart again
at an inopportune time. Isn't this a ustroag" a r v t ? what
kind of an earnest foundation for a proIetarian policy is this?
And what if the Kornilovists of the second draft wiII have lamed
something? What if they wail until hunger riots begin, until the
front is broken through, until Petrograd is surrendered, without
beginning action till then? What then?
What is p r o p o d is that the tactics of the proletarian party be
built on the poseibility of the Kornilovists' repeating one of their
old errors!
Let us forget all that was being and has been demon~tratedby
the BoUeviks a hundred times, all that the half year'a history of
our revolution has proven, namely, that there is no way out, that
there is no objective way out and can be none outside of either a
dictatorship of the KorniIovists or a dictatorship of the proletariat.
Let us forget this, let us renounce all thir and wait! Wait for what?
Wait for a miracle: for the tempestuous and catastrophic course of
events from May 3 until September 11 to be s u c d e d (due to the
prolongation of the war and the spread of famine) by a peaceful,
quiet, mooth, legal convocation of the Constituent A e m b l y and by
a fulfilment of its most lawful decisions. Here yon have the
"Marxiat'' tactics! Wait, ye hungry! Kereneky haa promised to
convoke the Constituent Assembly.
Them i s really nothing in the international situation that would oblige
us to act immediately; rather would we damage the muat of a Sociahit
revolution in the Weat, if we were to allow ourselves 10 be shot

This argument is h l y magnificent: Scheidemann "himself,"
Renaudel "himwlf' would not be able to "manipulate" more cleverly
tbe sympathies of the workers for the intemationa1 Socialist revolution I
Just think of it: under ddiahly diiiidt conditions, having but
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Liebknecht (and at bard labour at that), without newspepsre,
without freedom of assembly, without Soviets, with dl clasaea of
the popdation, including every mll-todo peasant, incredibly h w
tiIe to'the idea of internationalism, with the imprialiet big, middle,
and petty bourgeoisie splendidly organid-the Germans, i.e, the
German revolutionary internationalists, the German workers d r d
in 5aiIord jackets, started a mutiny in the navy with one chance of
winning out of a hundred.
But we, with dozena of papers at our disposal, freedom of 'maembly, a majority in the Soviets, we proIetarian internationalists, situated best in the whole world, ahould refum to support the German
revolutionbts by our uprising. We should reaaon like the Scheide
manna and Renaudela, that it is most prudent not to revolt, for if
we are shot, then the world wiIl lam such excellent, reaeonable, ideal
one

internationalists!
Let us prove how reasonable we are. h us pass a resolution of
sympathy with the German kurre&nbts, and let us renounce tbe
iasurrection in Russia. This would be genuine, wasonable internationalism. And how fast world internationalism would blw~lom
forth, if the same wise policy were to triumph everywhere!
The war has tired out, has mangled the workere of a11 countries
to the utmost. Oatbursts in Italy, in Germany, and in Austria, are
h o m i n g frequent. We aEone have Soviets of Workers' and SoIdiem' Deputies, Let as then keep on waiting. Let ua betray the
German internationalists a~ we am betraying the Rnesian peasants,
who, not by words but by deeds, by their uprising against the landowners, appeal to us to riiie against Kereneky's govmmmt.
Let the clouds of the imperialist conspiracy of the capitalist8 of
all cauntriee who are ready to &angle the R u d m Revolution
darken--we shall wait patientIy anti1 we are strangled by the ruble!
Instead of attacking tbe conspiratom and breaking their ranks by a
victory of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputieb let UE
wait for the Constituent AwmbIy, where all international plots will
be vanquished by voting, provided that Kerenslrp and Rodzyanko

.. .

.. .

conscientiously convoke the Constituent A s a d l y . Have we any
right to doubt the honesty of K e m d y and R c d z y d o ?
But "pmy men is -a
m1 We me isolated; the Central E
x&
Committee, the M e n s h m k ~ i n t e t a a t ithe
~ Narayrr Z h h peuplq
the Left SR's bave been h n l n g and will h u e a p p d &ahst us1
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and

A m m b g argtmeat. Up to now we have been mercilessly castia
gating the vacillators for their vacillationa, By so doing, we have

won the sympathies of the people. By so doing, we have conquered
the S o v i e without which the u p r i s i i could not be safe, quick,
aure. Now let us use the Soviets which we won over in order to
pass, ourselves, into the camp of the uacilhtors, What a splendid
career for Bal~hevisml
of the poIicy of tbe Liberdans and Chernovs,
The whole
and a j o of the 'Zeft" among the S.-R.'a and Menshevik, condsts
in d h w n s . As an indication of the fact that the musses are
&g
to ~e Left, note that the Left S.-R's and Menshevik-intern&tionalists have tremendous political importance. Two such facts as
the p & g of nome 4O per cent of both Men&&
and S+-R's
into the camp of the hft,on the one hand, and the peasant uprising,
on the other, are clearly and obviansIy connectd with each other.
But it is the Very character of this connection that reveals the
abysmal spinelmesa of tho= who have now undertaken to whimper
over the fact that the Central Executive Committee, which bas rotted
away, or the vacillating Left S.-R.'s and Co., have come out again&
us. For these vacillations of the petty-bourgeois l e a d e ~ h eMartow, Kamkovs, Sukhanova, and C o A a v e to be juxtaposed to the
uprising of the peasants. Here is a reufistic political juxtaposition.
With whom shall we go? With the vacillating handfuls of Petrograd leaders, who have indirectly e x p r d the radicalbation of the
masses, and who, at wry political turn, have abamefully whimpered, vacillated, run to ask foqivenesa of the Liberdans, A v b tyevs and Co., or with those masses that have moved to the Left?
The,and only thnr, can the paestion be stated.
Because the peasant uprising has been betrayed by the Martow,
Kamkms, and Sukhanovs, we, the workers' party of evolutionary
internationnlista, are asked also to betray it. This is what the policy
of "nodding" to the Left S.-R.'s and Men&evik-internationalists reduces itself to.
But we have said: to help the vacillating, we must stop vacillating ourselves. Those ' l o ~ e ~ yL"f t petty-bourgeois dernwrata in
their vacillations have even e y m p a t h i with a maIition! In the
long run we succeeded in m a b g them follow us became we ourselvas did not vacillate. Lie has vindicated us.
These gentlemen by their vacillations have always been ruinthe revolution. We alone have saved it. Shall we now shrink
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back, when the famine is knoclring at'the gates of Petrograd an&
Rodzyanko and Co. are preparing to surrender it?
But we have not even fim ccmnc~tionawith the railwaymen and the paetal
s PlanAnd can we pptn
employees. Their a&id repmmtativss ~ r the
withont the post o&e and without raiIroads?

Plansons bere, Lhtdans there. What confidence have
the mmses shown them? Is it not we who have kept on pro*
that
those leaders letrayed the nao4je~? Was it not from those lsaders
that the maam turned towards us, both at the elections in M o m w
and at the eIectiona to the Soviets? Or doesn't the mass of railroad
and p o d empIoyees starve? Nor strike against Kernsky and Go.?
"Did we have connectionar with &ex unions before March 12?n
one comrade asked a pessimist. The latter replied by pointing out
that the two revoIutions were not comparable. But this reply only
strengthens the position of the one who asked the qumtion. For it
is the Bolshevilrs who have spoken thousands of times about a prolonged preparation of the p r o l e t a h revolution against fie b u r geobk (and they have not spoken about it, in order to forget it on
the w e of uhe decisive moment). It is the very sepuraiion of the
p r o l ~ nelements of the masses from the petty-bourgeois and
bourgeoirr upper layer that characterisss tbe political and economic
life of the unions of postal ernployeea and railwaymen. What matters is not necessarily to m u r e beforehand m connection^'^ with o m
or the otber union; what matters is that only a Pictory of a proletarian and peasant uprising curt satisfy the musses both of the army
of railwaymen and of gosta1 and telegraph employees.

Yes,

pi,

Them is enough bread in Petrograd for two or three days. Can we give

b-d to the haurreutionists?
One of a thousand skepticat remarks (the skeptica can ulwuys
"doubt," and m o t be refuted by an*
but experience), one
of those remarks that put the burden where it does not belong.
It is Rodzyanko and Co., it is precisely the bourgeoisie that is
preparing the famine and speculating an etrangling the revolution
by famine. There is no escaping the famine and there can be mone
outside of an uprising of the peasants against the landomem in the
village and a victory of the workers over the capitalists in the cities
and in the centre Outside of this it is impossible eitber to get grain
from &E rich, or to transport it despite their sabotage, or to break
the resistance of the eormpt employees and the capitalist profiteers,
or to mtab2ish strict accounting. This has been proven by the his88

the stlpply organisatiom, of the efforts of the udemocraq"
that has comp&ed millions of times against the aabotage of the
capitalists, that har whimpered and supplicated.
Tbere ia no power on earth outside the power of a victorious
proletarian revolution that would pass from wmpIaints and begging
and tears, to reuohtionary action. And the Ionger tire proletarian
revolution is delayed, the Ionger it h protracted by events or by
the vacillations of the wavering and confused, the more victims it
wilI cost and the more difficult it wiI1 be to organ& the transportation and distribution of foodstuff^^
"Delaying the uprising means death"-*
in what we have t o
answer to thoere having the sad "murage" to Iook at the growing
economic ruin, at the approaching famine, and atill dissuade the
workers from the uprising (Wis, perslcade them m d ,and still
p h e canI;aence in th bourgeoijk)
tory of

.

Thure i a nu danger in the situation at the front either. Even if the aoldiers
conclude a wuce by themaelyea, there is stin no calamity in that.

But the soldiers wiI1 not conclude a truce TKi r e q u i r ~state
power, which cannot be obtained without an uprimng. The soldiera
will dmply run away. Reports from the front teIl &at. It is impomiible to wait without the risk of aiding a collusion between
Rodzyanlro and Wilhelm and without the risk of complete bnomic
min, with the soldiers running away in masses, o n e they (being
aJready close to desperatbn) sink into absolute despair and leave
everything to the mercy of fate.
But if we take power, and obtain neithar a truce nar a demoerado peace,
then the mldiws may not wi& t o fight a mIutionary war. What hi'

An argument which brings to mind the saying: one fool can a&
ten times more questions than ten wise men are capable of answering.
We have never denied the difEculties of power during an imperiaht war. Nevertheless, we have always preached the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. Shall we renounce
this, when the moment has actually arrived?
We have aIwayr said that the dictatorship of the -proletariat in
one country createa gigantic changes in the international ituation,
in the economic life of the country, in the condition of the army,
in its m o o k h a l l we now "forget" a11 this, and allow ourselves to
be frightened by the c i ~ u l t i e s "of the revolnrion ?
a7

Amm~rqmm,ahem~axenotinamoodthscwodddcivs&m
may bo mentioned
tbe unusual sprtad of rhs pogromh and Black Hundred prees.

fnto fhe streets. Among the signs justifying p&mlm

Whm people allow themdvcs to be frightened by the bourgeoisie,
then all objects and phenomwa naturaIIy a p p r yellow to them.
First, they subtitote an impmwioni~t,inte1Iectual criterion of the
movement for Qe Ma&
one; for a political analysis of the de
velopment of the class ~truggleand of dm murse of wenta thou&oat the COW
= a whole against the international background as
a whole, they ~ t a t subjective
e
impressions of moo&. That a
hparty line, its anyielding reaogve, is also a moad.creatiag factor,
particularly in the a h p t revoIutionay moments, they "cowedently" forget, of cause. It is sometimes very % o d e n t n for
people to forget that the r e s p o d l e leaders, by their wadlatiand by their readiness to burn their idols of yeeterday cause the
moat unbmming vacillations in the mtxld of certain strata of the
maEws

-

Secondly--and this is at present the main thing-in a p d & g
h u t the mood of the masses, the spinelms people forget to add:
that Meverybody" reports it aa a tense and expectant mood;
that 4'everybdy" agrees h
t
,called upon by the Soviets for the
defence of the Soviets, the workera will step forward as one man;
that "everybody" agrees that the workas are greatly dissatisfied
with the indec'ion of the centre m r n i n g the "hd decisive
struggle," w h a inevitability is clearly recogaid;
that "everybody" unanimously characterises the mood of the
broadat mas= a# close to despair and pointa at the anarchy de-

veloping on this very basis; and
that "everybody" also recwisea that there is among he clamconscious workers a definite unwillingness to go out into the streeta
only for demonatrationg only for partial struggles, since the approach of not a partial but a general struggle is in the air, while
the hopelessness of individual strike demonstration8 and acts of
prwKIure has been tested and fulIy understood.
And so /or&.

If we approach tbia c h a r a e t i o n of the maw mood from the
poht of view of the entire dedopment of the GI= and political
etruggle and of the e n h couree of events during the half year of
88

d
l h o m e dear to as how thoge p p l e frigbb
ened by the bourgeoisie are distorting the question. The question
is not the m e aa it was M o r e M a y 34,June 22,July 16, for then
there was a +spontmeuuexcikment which wa, as a party, either failed
to omprebend (May 3) or held back and shaped into a peaceful
demmatrakion (June 22 and July 161, for we knew very we11 at
that time that the Soviete were not yet ours, that the peaeante still
trusted the ~ d a n ~ and
o not
y the Bolshevik course (uprising), that consequently we collId not have back of ua the majority
of the people, and that comquently the uprising m premature.
At that time the question of the Iaat decisive struggle did not arise
at all among the majority of the c1m-conecions woxkers; not one
oat of a11 the party units would have raised that question at that
ti-.
An to the uam1ightened and very broad mmm, there war
neither a concentrated mood nor the resolve born out of despair
among them; there was only a spontaneous excitemem with the naive
hope of "influencing" Kernsky and the bourgeoinie hy "action,"
by a demonstration pure and simple.
What is n d d for an uprising is not this, but a conrnioua, fum,
and unswerving resolve on the part of the class-eonecious elements
to fight to the end; this on the one band. On the other, a concentrated mood of despair among the broad massea who feel that nothing can be saved now by half-measures; that you cannot "in0u&ceY'
anybody by merely influencing him; that the bungq wiIl "md
everything, destroy everything, even in an anarchiat way," if tbe
BoIahdts are not able to lead them in a decisive battle.
It is precisely to this combination of a tense mood as a result of
the lesbians of experience among the class-conscious elements and a
mood of hatred tow&
the lockout employers and capihIistb a
mood close to despair among tbe broadest mathat the development of the revolution has in practim brought both the workers and
the peasantry.
It is preckly on this basis that we can also understand the "succ d of the scoundrels of the Mack Hundred press who imitate
Bobheviam. That the Black Hundreds are fdl of maIicious glen
at the approach of a decisive battIe between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat, has been observed in all revoIutiom without exception;
this has always been so, and it is absolutely unavoidable. And if
you aIlow yourselvm to be frightened by thh cbmmtance, then
you have to renounce not only the uprising but the proletarian revoour revolution, it

a9

'

lntion in general. For this revolution in a capitalist society mmot
being mcompsnied by maIicous glee on the part of
the Black Hundreds and by h o p that they would be able to feather
mature without

their nest in
way.
The clss-conscious workers h o w perfectly well that tbe Black
Hnadreds work hand in hand with the bonrgmisie, and that a d e
chive victory of the workera (in which the petty bourgeoisie does
not believe, which the capitalists are afraid of, which the Black
Hundreds whh out of &ex malice, convinced as they are that the
Bolsheviks cannot retain power)-&at this victorp will utterly
the Black Hundreds, that the Bolshevih will be able to retain power,
firmly and to the greateat advantage of all humanity, tired out and
made wretched by the war.
Indeed, is them anybody in hie senses who can doabt that the
Rodzydas and Suvorias are acting in accord, that the roles are
distributed among them?
Has it not been proven by facts that K e d y acts on Rodzyanko'8
order, whiIe the "State Printing Prm of the R u d m Republic"
(don't laugh! ) prints at the exof the state the Black Hundred
a p h e s of the Black Hundred "State Duma"? Has not this fact
been exposed even by the IacIrep from the Dyela N o d a , who do
lackey service to "one of their little ilk"? Has not the experience
of all elections proven &at the Cadet nominations were fully supported by the Noooye Vremyu, which is a venal paper controlled
by the "interests" of the tsarist landowners?
Did we not read yesterday that commercial and industrial capital
(non-parti- capital, of course; oh, non-parthan capital, to be sure,
for the Vikhlyayevs and Rakitniko~s,the Gvozdm and Nikitias are
in malition not with the Cadets-God forbiLbut with the nompr&un commercial and industrial circles!) has donated the goodly
sum of 300,000 rublee to the Cadets?
The whole Black Hundred pms, as we look at thing from a clam,
not from a eenthnental point of view, is a branch of the firm "Ryabnsh;nskv, Milyukov, and Co." Capitd buys, on the one hand, the
Milyukovs, Zadavskys, PO~~ESOVB,
and rn on; on the other, the
Black Hundreds.
There is no other means of putting an end to this most hideous
poisoning of the people by the Black Hundred plague than the
&my- of the prokturht.
Is it any wonder that the crowd, tired out and made wretched by
M
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,

hunger m
a
a
d the proIongation of tbe war, eagerly r e a h out for
the Black Hundred p o b n ? Can one imagine a capitalist ~acietyon
the eve of a collapse without despair among the oppressed masses?
And can the despair of the maiws, a large part of w h o m are still in
darkness, not express k l f in i n m d mnsumption of all sorb of
poiaon?
No; tlth pmion of those wbo, in arguing about the mood of the
at the door of tbe masses their own personal spinelessm w ,
uem, is hopelesa The maseea are divided into those who conecioualg
wait and those who unconsciousIy are ready to sink into deepair; bat
the masm of the o p p d and the haagry are not spineless.
On the other band, the Mamint party cannot redoes tha q u d o n of an
uprieiag to the quention of a military conspiracy.
Marxism ia an unueuafly profound and many-sided doctrine. It
is, therefore, not to be wondered at &at acraps of quotations from
Marx-qecially when the qnotationar are made inappropriatelycan alwray~be found among the "argamentsn of those who break
with Marxism, A military empiracy is Blmqujm, i/ it b organised not by a party of a definite clam, ij its organism have not
analysed the poiitical moment in general and the international &ation in particular, if the party has not on ita side the sympathy
of the majority of the people, as proven by objeetme facts, if the
development of evatar in the revolution has not brought about a
~racticalrefutation of the coneihtory il1udons of the petty boargeoide, if the majority of the reqpiaed "plenipotentiary" or otherwise e x p r w d organa of revolutionary struggle Iike the Soviets have
not been conquered,if there has not ripened a sentiment In the army
(if this is going on during a war) against the government that protracts the unjust war againa the whoIe of the people, if the ~Iogans
of the uprising (like "All power to the Soviets," "Land to the
peasants,'' or "Immediate offer of a democratic peace to all the
beIligerent peoples, coupled with an immediate abrogation of a11
secret treaties and m e t diplomacy," etc.) have not k o m e widely
h w n and popular, if the advanced workers are not msvinced of
the despate situation of the maaae and of the anpport of the
vilIag6 a support proven by a serious peasant uprising or by an
upragainat the landowners and the govemmmt that clefen&
the landowners, if the economic situation of the country inspires
me with earnest hops for a favourabIe solution of the crisis by

pce8bb and pdianmkrry means.
U

Is thin s&cient?
In my pamphlet entitled: Will the ' B o b h e d a R&
S e
P~lgtf?'' ' (I h o p it wiII appear one of these days), I have re.ferred to a quotation from Mar* which d l y bears upon fie question
of an uprand d c h mFLTmratss the featmen of an uprising ae
an 4tart.n

I am ready to wager tbat if we were to prop- to all &one &atterera, wbo now &out h R h a@mt a military compiracy, to
open their month, if we were to appeal to them to explain the
difference b e e n the
of an armed up*
and a military
conspiracy that dmemea mderrmation, they could either repeat
what was quoted above or they would wwr thmdves with shame
and w d d call forth the generat ridicule of the w o r h . Why not
try, my dear ah-M&!
Sing us a mng ag"military conSphacf!

P05TscRm
The above linea had been written when I received at eight o'clock
T u d a y evening h e morning Pebograd papers, with an ar&Ie of
Mr. V. Bamrw in d e N m y a Z b h . Mr, Y. Bazarav aaeertn that
"a hand-nrritten' bnlletin was distrjbuted in the city, in which arguments were pmenkd in the name of two eminent Bolshevih, against
immediate action
If this is tme, I beg the mmradea whom thia letter canwt wach
earlier than Wednesday noon, to publish it atl quickfy as p d l e .
I did not d t e it for the preaue; X wanted to converse with the
member8 of oar party by way af correspondence. But if the h e m
of the N-a
Z&, who do not belong to the party and who have
been ridiculed by it a hundred times for their contemptibIe spinelessnw (those are the elements who voted for the B o l a h d the
day befare yemday, for the Meneheviks yesterday, and who almost
united them at the world-famous unity conpas), if such individuaIa
receive a bulkin from members of our party, in which they make
propaganda ag!inst an uprising, then we cannot k e p silent. We
muat agitate abo in favour of an uprising. Let the anonymous
individaats finally appear in the light of day, and let them bear
the punishment they dewme for their
vacillation-en
if it IR only the ridicule of all class-consc:ious workers. I have at
my dieposaI only one how before 1send the present letter to Pe~r*

."

grad and I, therefore, wish

to piat out only by a word or two a
"method" of the sad heroes of the brainlw N w a y a Zhim tendency.
Mr. V. Bmarov attempts to polemk againat Comrade Ryazaaov,
who has atid, and who is a thquaand timw correct in aaybg, that
"an uprising is being prepared by all those who create in the mas^^
a mood of despair and indifference."
The sad hero of a sad cause "rejoins" as follows:
'gave despair and indifference ever conquered?"
Ob, contemptible little fools from the N o v a Zhicn! Do they
know such exampIea of uprising in history as this, when the masses
of the oppressed classes were victorious in a desperate battle w i t h o ~
having been brought to despair by long sufferings and by an extreme
sharpening of all sorb of crises, when t h e m a w s had not been
seized by -ind&rence towards various lackey-like pmparliaments,
towards the idle playing with revolution, towards the reduction of
the Soviets by the Liberdans from organs of power and uprising to
the role of empty talking-shops?
Or have the contemptibIe little fools from the Nwayu Zhkn perhaps discovered among the ma- an idifleretwe t o the question of
bread, to the proIongation of the war, to land for +e peasants?

Written October 29-30, 2917.
Published in Rabochy Put, N m 4-41-42, November 1, 2, 3, 1917.-

LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY
Co~a~nEs!
X have not had a chanm yet to receive the Petrograd papers for
Wednday, October 31. When the full text of Kamenev's and
Zinoviev'a declaration, pub1ishe.d in the non-party paper, the Novayo
Z h ,was transmitted to me by teIephone, 1 r e f w d to believe it;
but it is impossible to doubt, and X am compelled to take the opportunity to transmit this letter to the members of the party by Thursday evening or Friday morning, for it would be a crime to keep
quiet in the face of such unheard-of strike-breaking.
The mom serious the practicaI problem, and the more responsible
and Uoutstaading"the persons committing tbe strike-breakbg, the
more dangerous it is, the more decisively must the atrike-breakera
be thrown oat, the more unforgivable it would be to hesitate even
in view of past ' ' d c e s n of the strike-breakers.
Ju& think of it! It is known in party circles that the party has
been d i a c d g the queation of the uprising since September. NObody has ever heard of a singIe letter or leaAet by either of these
p ~ i o n s ! Now, on the eve, we may say, of the Congress of Soviets,
two ontstanding Bolilhmib take a stand against the majority, and,
obviously, ugaa'wt the Central Committee. They do not say this
directly; and therefore tbe darnage to the cause is ail1 greater, for
it is more dangerous to e p k by hinting.
From the tea of Kamaev's and Zinoviwt declaration it ia perf d y cleat that they have taken a stand against the Central Committee, for otherwise their d~larationwould be &surd, however,
hey did not say which decision of the CentraI Committee they
disputed.

Why?
Quite obviously: h a u s e it has not beem published by the Central Committee.
What is it, then, &at we have here?
'Dealing wi& a bnrning problem of the highest importturce, OD
&

the eve of the critical day of November 2, two "outstanding &I&&''
attack an unpublished decision of the party centre in the
non-party press, in a paper which as far aa this given problem ia
concerned, goes hund in h a d wirh the bourgeoisie
khe
workerj' party!
Obviously, this ia a thousand timw meaner and a million times
more hmfd than were all the writings of Plekhanw in the n m party prwi in 1906-1907,which were so sharply condemned by the
party! But at that time it was a q u d o n only of elections, whiIe
now it is a question of an uprising for the potpose of conquering
power!
And with such a question before us, ajser the centre has made
a decision, to dispute thia unpublished decision before the Rods
yankos and Keren*s
in a non-party pap-an
one imagine an
action more treacherous, more strike-breaking?
X would conalder it a shame if, in consequence of my former
dm- to thme former comrades, I were to hesitate to condemn
them. I aay outright that I do not consider them comrades any
longer, and that I wiU fight with all my powers both in the Central
Committee and at the oongreehl to expel them both from the parry.
For a workem' party, which life conftonta ewer more often with
an npridq, cannot solve this =ult
problem if unpublished dacieions of the centre, after they have been accepted, are diputed
in the non-party pr- and vaci1lations and canfusion are biought
into the ranks of the fighters.
Let the gentlemen, Zinoviw and Kammev, found their own party
out of dozene of peopIe who have grown confused, or out of candidates for the Constituent A d I y . The workers will not join such
a party, for ita first slogan will be:
"Members of the Central Committee, defeated at tbe m&g
of
the Central Committee on the question of decisive conflict, may go
to the non-party press to make attacks tbere on the nnpublishd
d d o n r of the party."
Let them buiId such a party for themselvep; our party of Bolsheviks will only gain from it.
When all the documents are published, the strike-breaking activities of Zinoviev and Kamenw will stand out stiU more clearly. In
the meantime Iet the following question engage the attention of the
workers:
'Zet ua assume &at the administration of an all-Rdan trade
M

union hm deoidd, after a =&'I
dellbsratioa and with a majority
of over eighty per cmt, that it b
to prepare for a sarike,
without, however, publishing in the m e a a h e the date or anything
eIse. Let US, W m , amanme that, a+ the &&ion, two membws
d e r the hauchtlent pretext of a 'diiamhg opkioqnhave not only
hgm to write to the local group q j h g a m o d h a d m d ths
decision, but that they have also allowed thair letters to ba cam.
municated to the mn-party p a p . h
ha&, amme that &ey
thmdvea have in the non-party papers attacked this decision, althongb it has not been published as yet, and tbat they have bsgan
t o denounce the strike before the eyes of the mpitdish w d d
the workers hesitate in expelling from their midst such

breakers?"
As to how the u p N i question &an& now, ao nGar to N
ber 2, I cannot judge from afar how much damage was done to the
cause by the strike-breaking action in the non-party p m Vwy
great precsiwl damage has undonbtedlp h a c a a d . To m m d y
the situation, it b first of all neceesary to re-embllisb the tmity of
the Bolshevik front by excluding the etrike-breakers.
The weaknw of the ideo~ogikarguments against the u p i d q
will be the clearer, the more we drag them out into the open. I
have recently writtan an article about this in the Rabochy Art, and
if the editors do not h d it poaaible to put it in the paper, the
members of the party will probably get acquainted with it from the
manuwript.
These so.cal1ed Uideolgical" arguments reduce themselves to the
following two. First, they say, it is necessary to "Wait" for the
Constituent Assembly. Let as wait, they say, maybe we will bold
out-thia is the whole a r p m a t . M a y b despite famine, despite
economic ruin, despite the fact that the ddiera' patience is exhausted, despite ~~dzyanko'sstep towards surrendering Petrograd
to the Germans (even despite lock-oute), we will hold out.
Perhaps and m a y k t h i a is all the force of this argument.
The mend is noisy pessimism. Under the bourgeoisie and Keren&, they my, everpthig wm going on well; with us, ever*
will be bad. The capitalists have everything prepared wondqrfdly ;
tha workers have everythhg in bad shape. The "pmimistr" shout
all they can about the military aide of the matter, while the 'lo#=
M

mists" keep silent, for it is hardly p l e a m t to anybody outside of
the strikebreakers to reveal anything to Rodzyanko and K e r d y .

Hard times. A grave problem. A grave betrayal.
And stiU, the problem will be solved, the workers will become
consolidated, the peasant uprising and the extreme impatience of the
soldiem at the front wilI do their work! Let us c l m our ranks more
firmly-the

proletariat muat win!

M. Lmn.

LETTER TO THE MEMEERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
COMRADES!
I am writing these lines on the evening of the 6th. The situation
k extremely critical. It is ae clear as can be that delaying the
uprising now really means death.
With all my power I wish to persuade the comrades that now
everything bangs on a Lair, that on the order of the day are questions fist are not solved by canference~,by congresares (even'by
Congresses of Sovieb), but only by the people, by the masses, by
the struggle of armed masses.
The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovists, the removal of Verkhovsky show that we muat not wait. We must at any prim, this
evening, tonight, arrest the Ministers, having disarmed (defeated if
they offer resistance) the military cadets, etc.
We must not wait! We may lose everything!
The immediate gain from the seizure of power at present b:
defence of lhe people (not the congesa, but the people, in the first
$ace, the army and the peasants) against the Korniloviet government which has driven out Verkhovsky and has hatched a second
KorniIov pIot.
Who should wim power?
At present this is not important. Let the Military Revolutionary
Committee wize it, or "some other institution" which declares that it
rdinquish the power only to the real representatives of the
interests of the people, the interests of the Army (immediate offer
47

of peace), the inter& of the paamb (take the land immediateIy,
abolish private property), the interwta of ths hungry.
It is n e c m r y that a11 the boroughs, all regimen@ .all f o m
should be mobilimd and &ouId immediately send delegations to the
Military Revolutionary Committee, to the Central Committee of the
Bolsheviks, iasistentIy demanding that under no circmmtmc~is
power to be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co. u n d the 7tb,
by no means!-but that the matter must absolutely be decided this
evening or tonight.
History will not forgive delay by revolutionists who could be
victorious today (and will surely be victorions today), while they
risk loaing much tomorrow,they risk Iosing all.
If we seize power today, we seize it not against the Sovieta but
for them.
S e h of power i~ the point of the uprising; its politicaI task
will be cIarified after the &re.
It would be a disaster or formaIiam to wait for the uncertain voting
of Nwember 7. The people have a right and a duty to decide such
questions not by voting but by force; the people have a right and
duty in critical moments of a revoIution to give directions to tbeir
representatives, even their b& representatives, and nat ta wait for
them.

This has be& praven by the history of a11 revolutions, and the
be limitless if they let go the p r o p

crime of revolutionists would

moment, larowing that upon them depends the staving oj f e r e v o h
tion, the offer of peace, the saving of Petrograd, the ~ v i n gfrom
starvation, the transfer of the land to the peasants.
The government is tottering. We must deal it the &at.h blow at
any coat.

To deIay action is the stme as death
Writtan November 6, 1917.
Firm pubhhed in 1925.
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